The Belarus Crisis: How Can the EU Turn it Into an Opportunity?

This is part of a roundtable on the EU Neighborhood.

 

Belarus, 2020 Presidential elections: What could have been another ordinary rigged election won by the unchangeable leader of Belarus since 1994, Aleksander Lukashenko, this time turned out to be a promising chance to remove the “last dictator of Europe.” The opposing candidate of the incumbent president was Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, a housewife, former English teacher, now turned state leader in exile. She was admitted to the presidential race instead of her detained husband, video blogger and activist Sergei Tikhanovsky. Joined later by the heads of the staff of the other two candidates who were denied registration in elections, and focusing solely on organizing another round of free and fair elections if she wins, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya embodied an appropriate candidate.

Despite the uncontested popular backing for Tikhanovskaya, on August 9, Lukashenko was declared the winner of the race with 80 percent of the vote. This sparked predictable protests in Minsk and throughout Belarus, demanding free and fair elections. Tikhanovskaya rejected the results and urged authorities to hand in power peacefully. However, as the opposition leader was threatened in the office of the Central Electoral Committee, she was forced to leave the country for Lithuania. With protesters in the streets and European leaders rejecting Lukashenka’s reelection, the inauguration of the “elected” president took place in secret.

Tikhanovskaya: Turning exile into opportunity

In Lithuania, Tikhanovskaya benefits from protection from the government and has access to diverse media and diplomatic resources to support and promote the protest and resistance movement in Belarus by meeting with European and Western officials. She also expressed her intention to talk to Vladimir Putin, too. On October 13, Tikhanovskaya announced an ultimatum (known as People’s Ultimatum) for Lukashenko to step down, halt violence and release political prisoners until October 25. As the conditions were not met, another round of nationwide protests erupted including strikes in major state-owned companies.[1]

Tikhanovskaya calls on tougher sanctions and urges European companies to stop cooperation with state-owned companies whose leadership is persecuting and firing employees for supporting strikes or participating in the protests. She is referring to the personnel of the state owned Belaruskalii (the largest producer and supplier of potassium fertilizers in the CIS), which has already fired fifty-five people, while eight employees fled the country. There were cases when particular workers were locking themselves in mines demanding the resignation of the company’s leadership and the release of political detainees. In all these cases, miners were taken to a neuropsychiatric clinic.[2]

Tikhanovskaya’s team has launched several initiatives aimed at facilitating the transition period and filtering the institutions after Lukashenka steps down. The Unique Crime Registration Book platform was launched as a database where information about crimes can be uploaded by victims, witnesses and even aggressors.[3] The team is also pleading that the special force units of Belarus— “OMON” —is recognized as a terrorist organization.

“We are going out!” – The Belarus protest movement

The peaceful protest movement of Belarus is engaging citizens of diverse social background and is also intergenerational. Thematic protests are taking place weekly. Some days of the week are booked for certain social groups: Mondays for seniors, Thursdays for disabled persons, Saturdays for women, and Sundays for Unity Marches in which all citizens can participate. The peaceful format of manifestations turned out to be sustainable, even though faced with excessive police brutality and intimidation, as well as logistical challenges like shutting down the internet during protests or blocking the traffic and the subway in the regions where the protests are organized. Since the beginning of the protests more than 30,000 people have been already detained.

The protests are decentralized and there are no known organizers. Citizens are experimenting with new tactics such as the Rally of Neighbors. They gather in different places, usually neighborhoods, and protest. These tactics proved to be efficient as less people were detained, and security units were even more confused and disorganized, so much that, in some areas, they even had to flee. However, even this tactic is threatened as tikhary (plain-clothes officers) learned to infiltrate in local Telegram chats that help organize these small rallies. Since December, the organization of the protests requires a true guerilla struggle.[4]

A powerful trigger for the new wave of protests, especially among doctors, was the killing of Roman Bandarenka, who died as a consequence of violence from authorities. Authorities declared that he got into a fight while being drunk, which was publicly refuted by doctors. A journalist of the media portal TUT.by published the certificate that proved that Bandarenka’s blood contained no alcohol. The journalist and the doctor were arrested afterwards. Belarusian doctors have become one of the most “rebellious” segments of the population, refuting regime statements with testimonials and reflecting the real condition of the released victims.

Independent media and new media have a meaningful impact on providing information and visibility on the protests, organizing and coordinating some of them. This is mainly possible by the Telegram channels not controlled by state. For instance, the telegram channel NEXTA proved out to be successful in promoting the protests, announcing the time and location, publishing videos from rallies. However, the creators of NEXTA had to leave Belarus for Poland where they continue their work.

Belarus peaceful protests capture the attention of the post-Soviet community not only for its sustainability (more than 120 days of manifestations), as well as for poignant messages or creative manifestations through music, paintings / graffiti, performances and slogans which are allowing and attracting more citizens to express their support for the protests. The democratic protests in Belarus stand for (re)birth of the Belarus civic nation.

 

The Big Brother’s stance

Russia’s backing of Lukashenka’s regime comprised staged interactions and meetings with Russian officials. Among them we can mention the early September visit to Minsk of the Russian Prime Minister, which took place in the wake of a conversation between Berlin and Warsaw officials on the Navalny case and Belarusian protests being intercepted by Belarusian intelligence; or the late November visit to Minsk of the MFA of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, during which he reconfirmed Russia’s support for constitutional reform.

The constitutional reform that promises to limit the privileges of the president is considered by many a trick to delay Lukashenka’s exit from power. However, this step is beneficial to both Lukashenka and Putin. Lukashenka seeks a way to step down in a less hurtful manner, while Kremlin is looking for a suitable pro-Russian substitute of the president with whom Russia can collaborate in the future. The investigation platform The Insider published an article about an alleged plan of Kremlin to establish an anti-Lukashenka and pro-Russian party in Belarus to participate in future elections.[5]

It should be reiterated that further Russian support to Lukashenka’s regime is a risky move as it has already been confronted with a decrease in population’s preference for Russia. It is important to mention that the Belarus protests do not have a geopolitical aim, yet. These aren’t anti-Russian or anti-Putin. However, further collaboration between Kremlin and Lukashenka’s regime can change the vector.

Still, even Russian financial support for Lukashenka cannot last too long. There are high chances that the new anti-Russian sanctions with regard to Navalny poisoning will be adopted. These will definitely hit the economy and the terror regime in Belarus. So far, the economy of Belarus is already shaken. In order to maintain the state budget, authorities cut parts of the income of profitable state companies, while small and medium enterprises are facing endless controls and high fines.[6]

The tensioned relations between Lukashenka and Putin and their mutual aversion are widely known facts. Nevertheless, Kremlin has been supporting Lukashenka at least because they know what to expect from him. Previously, Lukashenka refused to recognize Russian-backed separatism in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, and has taken control of the local branch of Gazprombank[7]. He has also been active on the two fronts – turning its face to the EU when the relationships with Moscow were bad and viceversa.

 

Demonizing opposition

As expected, the actions taken by the opposition are broadly criticized and face an entire wave of propaganda and fake news. Fiercely demanded by the opposition, the latest European set of sanctions directed at the Belarusian companies are rated as a foolish and dangerous move that can harm the statehood of Belarus, according to the country’s MFA. In line with this statement, Russian foreign affairs officials expressed their concern about opposition’s demands of sanctions.[8]Sergey Lavrov stated that Western countries are trying actively to influence the socio-political processes in Russia and Belarus.

 

Why Lukashenka won’t go?

Lukashenka’s grip to power is explained, officially, by his patriotism and care for the Belarus people, as deducted from his populist rhetoric. In various periods, depending on the tensions with Russia (Wagner group) or the EU or in the context of elections (with staged terrorist attacks in Minsk subway), he was cultivating his image as the true defender of country’s sovereignty. He explains that his resignation would lead to chaos and a possible Belarus Maidan. He won’t go voluntarily unless he has safety guarantees that he won’t be judged or imprisoned and that he would also manage to save his assets. These safety guarantees are allegedly provided by the Kremlin.

In this situation, it is a clear sign to the European Union that Moscow has leverage on the political developments in Belarus. To put it more simply: It is under Russian supervision that things are changing—the Constitution is reformed and Lukashenka’s resignation is close. It can be speculated that in future, Russia can exploit this motive in its propaganda—as the country that helped its brother nation to be free, no matter how hypocrite it can look.

The European Union’s response

The EU demanded the publication of the official results of the elections, the immediate release of the detained, and called for a peaceful dialogue between authorities and the society. In the resolution of the European Parliament (EP) from the September 15, on the situation in Belarus, the EP asserted its support for the protesters, the civil society, and for the fundamental right of workers to strike without being repressed or dismissed.[9] In its second resolution on the continuous violations of human rights in Belarus, from November 25, the EP reiterated its call to establish a so-called European Magnitsky Act, that would facilitate the targeting of any individual, state and non-state actors responsible for or involved in human rights violations, abuses and corruption, without any further delay.

As the protests continued, faced with police brutal actions, the EU stood for harsher measures such as imposing economical and personal sanctions on Lukashenko and other persons affiliated with the falsification of elections, violation of human rights, as well as actors associated with state propaganda activities. So far, two sanction packages have been directed at more than 40 officials, Lukashenko included. On November 19, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU started to work on the third sanctions package. It targets 20 businessmen and 400 companies that are close to or are financing Lukashenko’s regime.[10]

In terms of financial assistance, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, announced an aid package of EUR 53 million targeted to the victims of repression, civil society and independent media, with another EUR 50 million directed to the health sector. However, the EP called for an increase of the EU funding for Belarus civil society.

 

Some other actions of the EU concerning Belarus include the latest initiative of the EP to stop Belarusian co-hosting of the 2021 Ice Hockey World Championship.[11] Individual member states’ initiatives cover imposing own sanctions on Belarusian individuals including Lukashenko, as the three Baltic states did,[12] or providing scholarships and places in European universities for students and teachers expelled from the universities in Belarus for supporting the protests.

 

The authorities seek to prevent mass student protests by arresting and expelling student activists, and closing borders for Belarus students studying abroad. More than 133 students have been expelled from universities and about 350 arrested. As a reaction to the European countries’ study offers for Belarus students, a Russian billionaire of Belarusian descent announced the possibility to finance the study of expelled students at Moscow and St. Petersburg universities.[13] Even though these cities represent the study destinations for numerous students, in recent years, the number of Belarus students going to Russia has decreased while those choosing Poland increased gradually.[14]

The efforts of the Belarus democratic opposition, independent media and civil society are being recognized at the European and international level. The democratic opposition of Belarus was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, the media portal TUT.by was awarded the Pavel Sheremet Journalism Award, while Financial Times, BBC and Bloomberg consider Tikhanovskaya one of the most influential woman of the year.

 

EU-Belarus relation and its future 

With regard to the future of the EU-Belarus relation, it is difficult to formulate a consistent and sustainable opinion, as we are witnessing a process that can lead to different scenarios. However, it would be wrong to eliminate Russia from the formula.[15] Tikhanovskaya’s team has issued 6 scenarios for possible political evolutions in Belarus. These make references to a possible Russian intervention that can lead to irremediable damage of Russian-Belarus relations or new presidential elections in the spring of 2021. It is noteworthy that all of the discussed scenarios lead one way or another to a dialogue between the representatives of the opposition and the representatives of the authorities or Lukashenka.[16]

It should be mentioned that for the last four years, the financial support of the EU for Belarus has raised twice. In January 2020, agreements on readmission and facilitation of the visa-free regime were signed.[17] With the falsification of elections and violent repressions of the protests, the progress made in the past years was put at risk. The resolution of the European Parliament called for a revision and suspending negotiations on the EU—Belarus Partnership Priorities until free and fair presidential elections are organized.

The EU took a wise step with long-term consequences by redirecting the financial assistance from the Belarus government directly to the civil society, as well as opening its borders and facilities to Belarus repressed citizens and expelled students. The EU is bound to support the protests. However, we can expect that, after the withdrawal of Lukashenko, the EU expertise will be needed even more in securing a safe transition of the country to democracy. One of the first actions of the EU in the context of a free Belarus should be to assist the country in institutionaleform and the resuscitation of the rule of law.

aving Russia in its immediate neighborhood would mean that the EU should give up any geopolitical gains for the benefit of the Belarus people. Here, the EU would rather have to push for its soft power capabilities—providing support to the civil society, journalists, activists and thus, gradually, making space for a pro-European entry. It may prove out more sustainable than a direct intervention in the internal affairs as pro-Russian actors could manipulate it to inoculate xenophobia and reticence towards the EU.

In her part, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya is building a foundation for the future (re)launched relations of Belarus with the European Union and international organizations. The future steps of a free Belarus would be to maintain a consistent and regular dialogue with the European Union, even under a pro-Russian leader. Last but not the least, Belarus would have to let go of its past as a country that underwent an authoritarian regime, and prove with concrete actions and reforms that it is a functional state and a trustworthy partner, and avoid the perspective of a Belarus fatigue from the EU’s side.

On the global scale, EU reasserts its role as a supporter and defender of democracy and human rights, but with a delicate and a careful approach. In its approach to Belarus, we can notice that the EU has learned from the past—especially from the Kyiv Maidan—not to intervene too much, yet to have a unitary, although delayed reaction. In its reluctance to get involved more, economic sanctions are the best measures the EU can take. It can be argued that the EU chooses not to intervene right now, waiting for a more active stance until after the reformed Constitution is adopted or new elections take place. The EU wants to gradually step in on a free and fair competitive terrain.

The EU’s approach to Belarus should be regarded as an opportunity to foster its authority and image in the Eastern Partnership, particularly, which is under the direct and merciless threat of the powerful and consistent Russian propaganda and local easy-to-corrupt authorities. It does right by supporting the people, the civil society and some economy sectors of these countries which are pleading for European values. For these countries, EU should stay open and supportive in order to gain leverage and help people achieve democracy and accountable institutions.

 

 

Vlada Șubernițchi is a student at the English-taught Master programme International Public Affairs at the University of Bucharest. She is also a research assistant within the Romanian Center of European Policies. Her fields of interest include European Neighbourhood Policy and socio-political evolutions in the former Soviet space. Having co-authored several policy briefs on disinformation and propaganda in the Eastern Partnership, she is also interested in methods of countering disinformation.

 

References:

AFP, “Belarus Opposition Leader Gives Lukashenko Ultimatum to Resign,” The Moscow Times (2020). Accessed November 19, 2020: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/13/belarus-opposition-leader-gives-lukashenko-ultimatum-to-resign-a71738

Deutsche Welle, “EU response to Belarus protests hampered by internal divisions”. (2020). Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.dw.com/en/eu-response-to-belarus-protests-hampered-by-internal-divisions/a-55008865.

Deutsche Welle, “Тихановская завела книгу регистрации преступлений белорусских силовиков” [Tikhanovskaya launched a register of crimes of the Belarusian security forces], Deutsche Welle (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.dw.com/ru/tihanovskaja-zavela-knigu-registracii-prestuplenij-belorusskih-silovikov/a-55787836

European Commission, “EU-Belarus relations,” European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 20, 2020: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/belarus_en

European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)), Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf

European Union: European Parliament, Joint Motion For A Resolution on the continuous violations of human rights in Belarus, in particular the murder of Raman Bandarenka (2020/2882(RSP)). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0389_EN.pdf

European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)). Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf

European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)). Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf; Елена Толкачева /

Moshes, Arkady. “Belarus Protests Have Explosive Potential for EU-Russia Relations,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2020). Accessed December 3, 2020: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83344

Slunkin, Pavel. “Glass half full: The EU’s policy on Belarus,” European Council on Foreign Relations (2020). Accessed December 3, 2020: https://ecfr.eu/article/glass-half-full-the-eus-policy-on-belarus/?fbclid=IwAR1YhNKyS3xYRU0-Eyja_c2XgABBc4Ocoe4IU3LG_WmMuP33EG3NLXwxvwc

The Insider, “План Б. Кремль создает в Белоруссии свою партию: против Лукашенко, но за интеграцию с РФ” [Plan B. Kremlin to create a new party in Belarus: anti-Lukashenka, but pleading for integration with the Russian Federation], The Insider (2020). Accessed December 25, 2020: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/01/05/the-angry-and-the-powerless?fbclid=IwAR2ycwBRkY3oStWRMxY5XmtyH3uNUJLw-5MtA2rBKBN62Na42IiTVX3rlDg

Tsikhanouskaya.org, “Переходный период: советник Тихановской – о том, что ждет Беларусь” [Transitional period: Advisor of Tikhanovskaya: What awaits Belarus], Tsikhanouskaya.org (2020). Accessed December 4, 2020: https://tsikhanouskaya.org/ru/events/news/a82e732df119ffc.html

Yapparova, Liliya. “The angry and the powerless How the opposition protests in Belarus became a guerilla movement. Liliya Yapparova reports from Minsk”, Meduza (2021). Accessed January 6, 2020: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/01/05/the-angry-and-the-powerless?fbclid=IwAR2ycwBRkY3oStWRMxY5XmtyH3uNUJLw-5MtA2rBKBN62Na42IiTVX3rlDg

Будик, Ульяна [Ulyana Budik]. “«Подобного не было даже в девяностых». Что сейчас происходит с минскими заведениями?” [There was no such thing even in the nineties. What is happening to Minsk locals now?], Afisha TUT.by(2020). Accessed December 2, 2020: https://afisha.tut.by/news/anews/708193.html

Лойко, Ольга [Elena Tolkacheva / Olga Loyko]. “Готовящийся пакет разрушит весь близкий власти бизнес, перекроет все потоки. Эксперты о новых санкциях” [The upcoming sanction package will destroy all businesses close to the authorities. Experts on new sanctions,” TUT.by (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://news.tut.by/economics/709031.html?c;

Настоящее Время [Current Time], “Российский миллиардер поможет белорусским студентам, которых отчислили за их гражданскую позицию” [Russian billionaire to help Belarusian students who were expelled for their civil position], Current Time (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.currenttime.tv/a/pomosh-belorusskim-studentam/30944028.html

Настоящее Время [Current Time], “Тихановская призвала европейские компании прекратить сотрудничество с госпредприятиями Беларуси” [Tikhanovskaya urged European companies to stop cooperation with state-owned enterprises of Belarus], Current Time (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-tihanovskaya-gospredpriyatia/30968694.html?fbclid=IwAR3vN2pSQs0fRX_mawsGlt1b9-aG7i4TC1FtXZ8UXxShIWgMrFfwlir4RbY

Перова, Аня [Anya Perova]. “Сколько белорусских студентов уезжают учиться в Россию и Польшу” [How many Belarusian students leave to study in Russia and Poland” TUT.by. (2019). Accessed December 3, 2020: https://news.tut.by/society/648038.html

Толкачева, Елена / Ольга Лойко [Elena Tolkacheva / Olga Loyko], “Готовящийся пакет разрушит весь близкий власти бизнес, перекроет все потоки. Эксперты о новых санкциях” [The upcoming sanction package will destroy all businesses close to the authorities. Experts on new sanctions,” TUT.by (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://news.tut.by/economics/709031.html?c

[1] AFP, “Belarus Opposition Leader Gives Lukashenko Ultimatum to Resign,” The Moscow Times (2020). Accessed November 19, 2020: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/13/belarus-opposition-leader-gives-lukashenko-ultimatum-to-resign-a71738

[2] Настоящее Время  [Current Time], “Тихановская призвала европейские компании прекратить сотрудничество с госпредприятиями Беларуси” [Tikhanovskaya urged European companies to stop cooperation with state-owned enterprises of Belarus], Current Time (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus-tihanovskaya-gospredpriyatia/30968694.html?fbclid=IwAR3vN2pSQs0fRX_mawsGlt1b9-aG7i4TC1FtXZ8UXxShIWgMrFfwlir4RbY

[3]Deutsche Welle, “Тихановская завела книгу регистрации преступлений белорусских силовиков” [Tikhanovskaya launched a register of crimes of the Belarusian security forces], Deutsche Welle (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.dw.com/ru/tihanovskaja-zavela-knigu-registracii-prestuplenij-belorusskih-silovikov/a-55787836

[4] Liliya Yapparova, “The angry and the powerless How the opposition protests in Belarus became a guerilla movement. Liliya Yapparova reports from Minsk,” Meduza (2021). Accessed January 6, 2020: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/01/05/the-angry-and-the-powerless?fbclid=IwAR2ycwBRkY3oStWRMxY5XmtyH3uNUJLw-5MtA2rBKBN62Na42IiTVX3rlDg

[5] The Insider, “План Б. Кремль создает в Белоруссии свою партию: против Лукашенко, но за интеграцию с РФ” [Plan B. Kremlin to create a new party in Belarus: anti-Lukashenka, but pleading for integration with the Russian Federation], The Insider (2020). Accessed December 25, 2020: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2021/01/05/the-angry-and-the-powerless?fbclid=IwAR2ycwBRkY3oStWRMxY5XmtyH3uNUJLw-5MtA2rBKBN62Na42IiTVX3rlDg

[6] Ульяна Будик [Ulyana Budik], “«Подобного не было даже в девяностых». Что сейчас происходит с минскими заведениями?” [There was no such thing even in the nineties. What is happening to Minsk locals now?], Afisha TUT.by (2020). Accessed December 2, 2020: https://afisha.tut.by/news/anews/708193.html

[7] Pavel Slunkin, “Glass half full: The EU’s policy on Belarus,” European Council on Foreign Relations (2020). Accessed December 3, 2020:https://ecfr.eu/article/glass-half-full-the-eus-policy-on-belarus/?fbclid=IwAR1YhNKyS3xYRU0-Eyja_c2XgABBc4Ocoe4IU3LG_WmMuP33EG3NLXwxvwc

[8] Елена Толкачева / Ольга Лойко [Elena Tolkacheva / Olga Loyko], “Готовящийся пакет разрушит весь близкий власти бизнес, перекроет все потоки. Эксперты о новых санкциях” [The upcoming sanction package will destroy all businesses close to the authorities. Experts on new sanctions,” TUT.by (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://news.tut.by/economics/709031.html?c

[9] European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)). Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf

[10] European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)). AccessedNovember 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf; Елена Толкачева / Ольга Лойко [Elena Tolkacheva / OlgaLoyko], “Готовящийся пакет разрушит весь близкий власти бизнес, перекроет все потоки. Эксперты о новых санкциях” [The upcoming sanction package will destroy all businesses close to the authorities. Experts on new sanctions,” TUT.by (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://news.tut.by/economics/709031.html?c; European Union: European Parliament, Joint Motion For A Resolution on the continuous violations of human rights in Belarus, in particular the murder of Raman Bandarenka (2020/2882(RSP)). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0389_EN.pdf

[11] European Union: European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus, 15 September 2020, (2020/2779(RSP)), Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0271_EN.pdf

[12]  Deutsche Welle, “EU response to Belarus protests hampered by internal divisions”. (2020). Accessed November 20, 2020: https://www.dw.com/en/eu-response-to-belarus-protests-hampered-by-internal-divisions/a-55008865.

[13] Настоящее Время [Current Time], “Российский миллиардер поможет белорусским студентам, которых отчислили за их гражданскую позицию” [Russian billionaire to help Belarusian students who were expelled for their civil position], Current Time (2020). Accessed November 30, 2020: https://www.currenttime.tv/a/pomosh-belorusskim-studentam/30944028.html

[14] Аня Перова [Anya Perova], “Сколько белорусских студентов уезжают учиться в Россию и Польшу” [How many Belarusian students leave to study in Russia and Poland,” TUT.by. (2019). Accessed December 3, 2020: https://news.tut.by/society/648038.html

[15] Arkady Moshes, “Belarus Protests Have Explosive Potential for EU-Russia Relations,” Carnegie Moscow Center (2020). Accessed December 3, 2020: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83344

[16] Tsikhanouskaya.org, “Переходный период: советник Тихановской – о том, что ждет Беларусь” [Transitional period: Advisor of Tikhanovskaya: What awaits Belarus], Tsikhanouskaya.org (2020). Accessed December 4, 2020: https://tsikhanouskaya.org/ru/events/news/a82e732df119ffc.html

[17] European Commission, “EU-Belarus relations,” European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Accessed November 20, 2020:https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/belarus_en

Photo: Aleksandar Lukashenko, president of Belorus at a press conference during serbian-belorusian bilateral meeting in Belgrade, Serbia
Published on February 9, 2021.

Share:

Print Friendly, PDF & Email